Does focus matter for board monitoring? This paper investigates the costs and benefits of dispersion in directors' incentives and ability within corporate boards. Directors exhibit a considerable amount of heterogeneity in their ownership in the firm, number of outside board appointments, and the characteristics of the other companies in which directors hold appointments. Firm and industry characteristics appear to affect the preference towards more versus less board heterogeneity. Board heterogeneity has significant effects on firm value and key firm decisions that cannot be explained by board composition, size, and expertise levels. Heterogeneity in director industry expertise is associated with lower firm value, which underscores the importance of focus in director appointments. Heterogeneity in director ownership incentives similarly has a negative effect on firm value. Heterogeneous boards compensate the CEO with less incentive pay and higher total pay. We also find that board heterogeneity is associated with lower cash holdings, higher dividends, and higher leverage.
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I. Introduction
A growing body of empirical research examines the structure and effectiveness of corporate board of directors. Boards monitor top management and provide advice to the CEO on key corporate decisions. One strand of the literature has examined the ability of boards to monitor effectively and focused on the effects of board independence, size, equity ownership, executive experience, and number of outside board memberships on firm value and performance (see, e.g., Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990; Yermack, 1996; Yermack, 2004; Fich, 2005; Fich and Shivdasani, 2006, among others) . An additional part of the literature has examined the determinants of board composition (e.g., Boone, Karpoff, Field and Raheja, 2007; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Coles, Daniel and Naveen 2008, among others) . Differently from existing work, we study within-board heterogeneity in director characteristics. We argue that heterogeneity within the board will affect the performance of the board as a group in the exercise of its monitoring and advisory tasks. Rather than focus on the average measures such as the proportion of outsiders, or the average experience of board members, we examine dispersion in director incentives and acquired experience at the firm level.
The research agenda is threefold. First, we characterize the extent of within-board heterogeneity along dimensions associated with measures of board members' incentive to monitor and ability to advise management. Our main measures of incentives to monitor are director ownership in the firm and the number of outside appointments (the number of outside appointments measures reputational incentives). Director's ability to give advice is measured based on the experience of directors in other industries, and the age of the companies in other directorship appointments.
2 Second, we identify firms and industries in which heterogeneous boards are more prevalent. It is plausible that board composition, including the extent of dispersion in director characteristics, will be chosen optimally given firm and industry conditions and the visibility of the firm. Among the variables we consider as potential determinants of board heterogeneity are firm size, the extent of growth opportunities, degree of uncertainty in the firm, asset specificity, technology focus of the industry, and intensity of product market competition. We use previous work on board's monitoring and advising function to drive the hypotheses for board heterogeneity.
Third, we examine the relation between board heterogeneity, firm value, and valuerelevant firm decisions. Greater board heterogeneity may have two effects. On the one hand, heterogeneous boards face conflicts of interest and higher coordination costs, which hamper board members from efficiently performing their monitoring and advisory functions. On the other hand, greater heterogeneity can increase the amount and quality of information available to the board, improving its ability to advise top management on a range of corporate problems and to monitor the CEO's investment decisions. We note that the costs and benefits of heterogeneity in the board may not apply equally to measures of monitoring and advisory heterogeneity since the ability of the board to monitor and the ability to give advice may be independent of one another and may require different skills from board members.
Our main findings are as follows. First, corporate boards exhibit a considerable amount of heterogeneity in the areas of director experience, ownership stakes, and reputational incentives. Second, firm and industry characteristics appear to affect the preference towards more versus less board heterogeneity. Third, we find that even after controlling for firm and industry characteristics, heterogeneity in director monitoring incentive and ability to give advice 3 has significant effects on firm value and key firm decisions that cannot be explained by board composition, size, and expertise levels. Heterogeneity in monitoring incentives is associated with lower firm value, which underscores the benefits of focus in director appointments. Of note is the finding of a lesser role for incentive pay in managerial compensation in firms with heterogeneous boards. Further, boards with considerable dispersion in director reputational incentives assume more debt, possibly to compensate for the weaker internal monitoring efforts undertaken by such boards.
Consistent with the arguments presented in Klein (1998) , Adams and Ferreira (2008a) , and Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008) among others, we find that the heterogeneity in director's ability to give advice is an important factor affecting firm value. Heterogeneity in director industry expertise is associated with lower firm value, which underscores the benefits of focus in director appointments. It is also associated with lower cash holdings, lower investment levels and less incentive pay in managerial compensation.
Several caveats apply. As in other board studies, evidence on the relation between board heterogeneity and firm valuation mostly applies to associations rather than causal relationships, all else given. Further, the empirical tests of the two alternative predictions (conflicts of interest and increase in coordination costs versus effective monitoring and improvement in the quality of information) will show the larger of the two effects. Thus, for example, while it is possible that there are benefits due to improvement in the quality of information in more heterogeneous boards, our negative results suggest that the costs of coordination may be higher than the benefits of heterogeneous boards. Finally, as a number of governance variables are correlated, one has to be mindful of potential collinearity concerns, so we attempt to address them in sensitivity checks. 4 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The section two overviews related literature on within-group heterogeneity and board governance and formulate the main testable predictions. The section three discusses the sample, variables, and methodology. Section four presents the empirical results. Section five concludes.
II. Related literature and testable predictions
Related corporate governance literature on boards Most of the literature on corporate board considers levels and not heterogeneity of various director characteristics. Related work focuses on director incentives to monitor and considers the role of director ownership, retention in the firm, as well as the number of outside directorships. Studies have examined the effects of poor performance on the directorships of board members. For example, Kaplan and Reishus (1990) find that top executives of firms that cut dividends are about 50% less likely to receive additional outside directorships than top executives of firms that do not cut dividends. Beasley (1996), and Fich and Shivdasani (2007) find a decrease in the number of additional directorships for directors involved in companies with financial fraud. Yermack (2004) examines director incentives stemming from ownership, reputation, and retention, and Adams and Ferreira (2008b) find that even relatively small incentives, such as meeting fees (the average per meeting fee in 2003 dollars is $1,000), increase director involvement in firms and the likelihood of directors attending board meetings.
In addition to performance incentives, other studies have considered how the number of outsider board memberships affects director incentives to monitor. Fich and Shivdasani (2006) examine the busyness of outside directors and find lower market-to-book ratios, lower profitability, and lower sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance in firms where the majority of outsiders on the board hold three or more directorships. In terms of director background and the ability to give advice, several existing papers examine the implications of specific experts on boards. Krozner and Strahan (2001) focus on the implications of bankers on boards. Guner, Malmendier, and Tate (2006) analyze directors with financial expertise. They find that the presence of commercial bankers on boards increases the size of loans and decreases investment to cash flow sensitivity whereas the presence of investment bankers is associated with more frequent outside financing and larger public debt issues. However, bankers on boards are also associated with worse stock and earnings performance after acquisitions as banker directors need not act in the interest of shareholders. In a related study of director expertise, Fich (2005) finds that markets react favorably to appointments of executive experts (managers of other firms) to boards of directors. Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) find a greater incidence of politically experienced directors in larger firms, firms reliant on sales to the government, exports, and lobbying and a greater fraction of legal experts on boards of larger firms and firms facing costly environmental regulation. Papakonstantinou (2007) documents positive effects of board industry experience on performance. Existing work has also used industry expertise among other board characteristics (see, e.g. a study of earnings timeliness in Bushman, Chen, Engel, and Smith (2004) and an analysis of the effects of Sarbanes Oxley in Duchin, Matsusaka, and Ozbas (2008) ). Adams and Ferreira (2008a) consider board diversity by studying the effects of women on boards. They find that gender-diverse boards are associated with greater CEO turnover 6 sensitivity to stock performance and that directors receive more equity-based compensation in firms with more gender-diverse boards. However, they find that average effect of gender diversity on firm performance is negative, suggesting an overall cost to forcing companies to have a more diverse board.
The above studies contribute to our understanding of the potential effects of various board characteristics on monitoring quality and firm policies. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to examine diversity in board members' expertise and monitoring incentives, and investigate its role for firm performance and a number of value-relevant firm policies.
Testable predictions
Determinants of board heterogeneity
The first question in this paper focuses on the firm, industry, management, and state characteristics that lead firms to select more heterogeneous boards. We draw on the existing literature to identify factors that may influence board heterogeneity (for ex., Hermalin and Weisbach (1988), Yermack (2004) , Boone et al. (2007 ), Linck, et al. (2008 , Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008), and Lehn Patro and Zhao (2008) ).
First, oversight of large firms with complex asset structures requires board members to conduct more intensive monitoring and acquire more information (Fama and Jensen (1983) , Lehn et al. (2004 ), Crutchey et al (2004 ), and Boone et al (2007 ). In such a setting, shareholders would elect directors with varying degrees of monitoring incentives, leading to greater diversity in director characteristics. In addition, firm complexity increases the importance of the board's advisory role and entails a need for greater diversity in director expertise (Klein (1998), Agrawal and Knoeber (2001) , Adams and Ferreira (2008a) , Adams and Mehran (2003), and Coles, Daniel 7 and Naveen (2008)). Thus, we expect larger and more complex companies to require a more heterogeneous board both in terms of their monitoring incentives as well as in their ability to provide advice. Next, the environment in which a company operates and the costs of information acquisition by board members are expected to affect board heterogeneity. Existing work provides two competing hypotheses on the effect of the firm's information environment and competition on board characteristics. In the ownership literature, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) propose that the noisiness of a firm's operating environment will affect monitoring costs. In the board literature, Coles et al. (2008) , Lehn et al. (2004), and Linck, et al. (2008) , argue that boards operating in companies with significant growth opportunities and greater information asymmetry will require higher levels of information to the board and greater need of advice to the CEO. This seems to imply a more heterogeneous board in firms with high growth opportunities and operating in competitive environment. Further, in industries with lower asset specificity, focus and similarity in director experience may be less important.
At the same time, the models presented in Raheja (2005) and Harris and Raviv (2007) show that companies operating in noisier environment can benefit from lower coordination costs among board members to increase the efficiency of decision-making in the board. Therefore, for firms with significant growth opportunities and firms operating in competitive industries, coordination costs associated with heterogeneous boards may detract from focus on the firm's core investment opportunities.
In our empirical tests, we use growth opportunities, the level of industry competition, the technology intensity of the industry, and the level of asset specificity to measure information acquisition requirements for the firm. 
Hypotheses on effects of board heterogeneity on firm value
Boards of directors are susceptible to collective action problems with respect to monitoring and advising the CEO. Individual directors share (fractionally) in the firm value gains from sound investment decisions through equity stakes (Yermack, 2004) . Further, Kaplan and Reishus (1990) and Fich (2005) show that directors of successful firms benefit in reputational terms as they are more likely to be invited on other company boards. However, acquiring and analyzing information about investment projects proposed by the management and partaking in monitoring of the CEO poses a private cost to an individual board member. For outside board members, the detailed scrutiny of one firm's managerial decisions incurs an opportunity cost of time and effort that could be expended on other board appointments as well as attending to the full-time job tasks at the main place of employment. In addition, for both inside and outside directors, opposing a corporate decision proposed by the CEO exposes the dissenting director to potential pressures from the CEO and/or other board members (see, for example, the model presented in Warther (1998)). Heterogeneity in director characteristics can affect the overall level of monitoring and advising undertaken by board members above and beyond the effects of board size and board independence.
In addition to the direction of the heterogeneity effect, we also investigate the source of heterogeneity (payoffs / incentives versus experience / skill of individual board members). In the context of boards of directors, the payoffs directors derive from effective board governance are comprised of gains on company stock they hold (equity incentives) and reputational gains that aid with future board appointments (proxied by the number of other appointments or presence of a full-time position). Heterogeneity in individual director skill or experience can be proxied by 9 the presence of industry specific expertise and more generally, expertise in firms of similar industry or age.
Below we discuss existing work on the costs and benefits of within-group heterogeneity.
This issue has been analyzed in the context of public good provision and collective action problem, game theory work on decision making of committees with heterogeneous agents, labor economics models of group production, and social sciences research.
The notion of costs of heterogeneity in group decision arise from models of public good provision that predict a more collective action problems and less cooperation with heterogeneous agents (see, e.g., Cornes, 1993; Vigdor, 2004; Bardhan, 1993; Ledyard, 1995, etc.) In particular, within-group heterogeneity in payoffs interferes with collective action and increases the cost of sustaining cooperation due to free riding and divergence in incentives among agents. Further, in the game theory literature on committee decision making, heterogeneity in agent preferences can impede information sharing and lead to untruthful information revelation (see, e.g., AustenSmith and Feddersen, 2005 ; also see Vandenbussche (2006) for a detailed survey of the models of policy committees). Fluck and Khanna (2008) model group decision making in the context of corporate board decisions and show that frictions between information collection and information sharing and free riding among active board members can decrease overall board monitoring and firm valuation in cases where board members discuss their information prior to decision making. Thus, the surveyed work would predict higher coordination costs and lower firm value in the presence of heterogeneity in board member payoffs 1 .
Related to board heterogeneity and monitoring, Adams and Ferreira (2008) find that gender-diverse boards are associated with increased board meeting attendance and overall board monitoring, but this is associated with a decrease in overall firm value. They attribute this decreased overall value to arguments in Almazan and Suarez (2007), Adams and Ferreira (2007) ,
and Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997) that too much monitoring can decrease shareholder value. While the arguments in these papers are not about free riding, but instead about too much monitoring, the overall result is similar to the above argument that heterogeneity in payoff can be associated with a decreased shareholder value.
Focusing on the benefits of heterogeneity, Bergstrom, Blume, and Varian (1986) show that heterogeneity in endowments increases the public good provision. In some sociology and labor economics work, heterogeneous groups may be more likely to overcome collective action problems (e.g., Heckathorn, 1993; Oliver, Marwell, and Teixeira, 1985; Kandel and Lazear, 1992 ), particularly at low levels of heterogeneity and payoffs.
Thus, we test two possible hypotheses in terms of the heterogeneity of payoffs among board members:
1.
Conflicts of interest hypothesis:
Board-member payoff heterogeneity decreases incentives for individual board members to acquire information and monitor management, resulting in a negative effect on firm value
2.
Effective monitoring hypothesis: Board-member payoff heterogeneity increases the incentives for individual board members to acquire information thus increasing the ability of the board to monitor management, resulting in a positive effect on firm value 11 With respect to abilities and expertise, labor economics work that treats individual worker skills as additive intermediate production inputs would predict a positive effect of heterogeneity (see, e.g., Alesina, Spolaore, and Wacziarg, 2000; Hamilton, Nickerson, and Owan, 2003; Erhardt, Webel, and Schrader, 2003) . Heterogeneity in skills could result in greater flexibility and information, particularly under uncertainty.
Differences in expertise are also likely to lead to variation in forecasts of the outcomes of investment projects. Stock and Watson (1999) and Elliott and Timmermann (2004) show that aggregation of individual forecasts improves forecast accuracy. To the extent to which expertise affects director information sets, aggregation of forecasts of board members with heterogeneous expertise could improve the board's ability to predict the future outcomes of managerial decisions. Work on committee decision making (e.g., Sibert, 2003) shows that aggregation across heterogeneous agents can lead to smoother committee decisions.
At the same time, divergence in director opinion could lead to a slower decision making and more conflicts in the board. Related to arguments Jensen (1993), Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Yermack (1996) , homogeneous boards may be more cohesive and productive, thus leading to more effective firm decisions. Baranchuk and Dybvig (2006) present a model where multiple directors with divergence of opinions can increase conflict on the board and reduce the ability of the board to pursue effective strategies.
Thus, we test two possible hypotheses in terms of the heterogeneity in director experience:
3.
Difficulty of coordination hypothesis: Board-member experience heterogeneity increases coordination costs among board members and decreases the ability of board members to make decisions, resulting in a negative effect on firm value 12 4. Quality of information hypothesis: Board-member experience heterogeneity increases the amount of information available to the board thus increasing the ability of the board to be effective, resulting in a positive effect on firm value
For both heterogeneity in director payoffs and heterogeneity in director experience, the question of which hypothesis prevails in the case of corporate board heterogeneity is ultimately an empirical one. Further, because the monitoring incentive is associated with directors' payoff and incentive to maximize firm value, whereas the advisory incentive is associated with directors differences in information based on experience, it is possible that the costs and benefits of the different types of heterogeneity are different from one another.
III. Data and variables
Sample
The sample includes firms with available Compustat, CDA Spectrum, and Corporate 
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Variable definitions and summary statistics are presented in Table 1 .
[ Table 1 (median of 0.75). The measure can be interpreted as the probability that any two randomly picked board appointments held by the firm's directors at other firms will be in different industries.
Two refinements of heterogeneity in industry expertise are used for robustness. In the first case, we consider the possibility that insider positions on another firm's board contribute materially to director's experience. We therefore redefine heterogeneity in industry expertise using only appointments to other firms' boards in the insider capacity. In the second case, we revisit the assumption about the additive nature of individual directors' experience in a given industry. Instead of counting each appointment for directors with several other board seats, we focus on the most influential appointment. The following data filters are applied (in the order below) to identify the most influential appointment for each director, excluding the sample firm: insider status; lead director status; length of tenure on the board; firm size.
In addition to heterogeneity in expertise in different industries, we examine dispersion in other areas of board member experience. Directors can be broadly classified into categories or functional fields of expertise, including academic expertise, outsider experience in a Main Street firm (non-financial firm that is not in the sample firm's industry), insider experience in a Main Other board characteristics
We recognize that differences in board heterogeneity can be related to other board characteristics, including board size and independence. Unless otherwise specified, board characteristics are obtained from Board Analyst. The average board in the sample has 10.7 17 members. The proportion of independent directors is commonly interpreted as a measure of board conflicts of interests. On average, over two-thirds of the board is comprised of outside directors, which is consistent with the effects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act during the sample period. The level of director equity incentives is captured using percentage equity stake (the average of 0.64% of shares outstanding for an average director and 6.3% for all directors). At an average firm in our sample, a director holds 2.4 appointments, and 38% of directors are busy, with three or more board seats. Lastly, we construct the level of board industry expertise as the proportion of directors with other board appointments in the same Fama-French industry as the sample firm in a given year. For the average firm, over 7% of directors can be classified as 'industry experts' using our definition.
Firm value and corporate decisions
Our analyses of bottom-line effects of board heterogeneity focus on firm value. Similarly to earlier work, we measure firm value as the ratio of market value of the firm to the book value of total assets. Sample average market-to-book ratio is 1.4. In robustness checks, the denominator of the market-to-book ratio is replaced with lagged book value. And the numerator is computed with and without adjustment for deferred taxes. Return on assets is used as an alternative measure of firm performance. An average firm in the sample realizes a 14.2% annual return on assets.
We also examine several proxies for corporate decisions to understand potential reasons behind the effects of heterogeneity on firm value: total CEO pay level, use of incentive compensation, cash holdings, dividend payout level, investment, and leverage ratio. The CEO at the average sample firm receives $6.6 mln in annual compensation, including approximately 37% in the form of stock option grants. To account for significant correlation of executive 18 compensation with firm size (and mitigate the effect of the right tail), we normalize total CEO pay by the firm's market value. The use of incentive pay is measured using the percentage of stock option grants in total compensation. Cash holdings are measured using the proportion of cash and short-term investments in total assets net of cash. For the average firm, cash comprises approximately 34% of total assets (the median is 10%). Dividend payout is defined as the ratio of cash dividends on common stock scaled by market value of the firm (1% for the average firm).
Leverage ratio is computed as the fraction of long-term debt in total assets (23% for the average firm). Market leverage is used for robustness and is defined as the ratio of long-term debt to the market value of total assets. Investment is measured using the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets (with missing values replaced with zero, similarly to Frank and Goyal (2003)). Total investment, defined as the sum of capital expenditure and research and development expenditure, is used for robustness.
Firm characteristics and miscellaneous control variables
To account for the possibility that other characteristics explain both heterogeneity measures and firm value, we control for several other variables in firm value regressions. The following variables are obtained from Compustat. Firm size is measured using log of market value. The average firm in our sample has market value of $7.0 bln in assets. Cash flow is measured as income before extraordinary items plus depreciation, scaled by total assets. (The variable is excluded from ROA regressions.) Sales growth, our proxy for the extent of growth opportunities, is defined as the annual change in net sales. Sample firms have on average grown at the annual rate of 11.2% per year. Cash flow volatility is the standard deviation of return on assets computed over ten-year rolling annual periods. We also include firm age defined as the log of the number of years since the firm's first listing in CRSP. The average firm age is 24 years.
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Institutional investors may play a significant role in the firm. Without assuming causality, we control for the total percentage stake of institutional investors in the firm. 3 Institutional holdings are obtained from CDA Spectrum 13f filings.
Board heterogeneity measures are predicted using firm size, age, cash flow volatility, high tech industry dummy, log of number of business segments, S&P500 dummy, log of number of firms in the industry, specificity of assets in the industry (industry median share of property, plants, and equipment in total assets), and product market concentration (sales-based Herfindahl index). The listed variables are expected to affect the benefits and costs from heterogeneous boards.
To mitigate the potential impact of extreme observations, continuous variables are winsorized at one percent of the left and right tail of the distribution.
Methodology
Ordinary least squares estimates are reported, unless otherwise indicated. Industry dummies at the three-digit SIC level and year effects are included in all regressions. We report tstatistics based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors with clustering by firm.
To address potential causality issues with board heterogeneity, we lag all right-hand-side variables one period. We also estimate two-stage least squares regressions, using determinants listed above and industry median of board heterogeneity as first stage predictors of heterogeneity.
IV. Results
Several firm and industry characteristics that could be capturing costs and benefits of heterogeneity are considered in Table 2 . We note that the four dimensions of heterogeneity exhibit distinct relations with firm and industry controls. In the case of industry expertise, a more diverse set of directors is attracted to the boards of larger, older, S&P500 firms that are well established. For mature firms with fewer growth opportunities and firms in less competitive industries, coordination costs arising from heterogeneous board expertise are relatively less important, resulting in more heterogeneity. In contrast, high tech and growth firms retain directors with more industry focus. In case of expertise with growth opportunities, low asset specificity (a high proportion of tangible assets), which potentially increases demand for more transferable director skills, marginally increases heterogeneity. Firm level risk plays a significant role. The need to adjust to uncertainty increases potential benefits from a heterogeneous board containing directors exposed to different levels of growth opportunities. A similar effect is observed for heterogeneity in the number of board appointments. Larger boards have more heterogeneity in the number of board appointments held by its members. However, larger and more mature firms' directors receive less disperse equity incentives (perhaps, to compensate for greater heterogeneity along other dimensions).
[ Table 2 ]
We next turn to the relation between board heterogeneity and firm outcomes. Tabulations are shown in Table 3 . Means of firm value and corporate decision variables are reported by quartiles of board heterogeneity.
[ Table 3] 21 Tabulation results are mixed. Firm value and performance appear to have a negative relation to board heterogeneity although the sign is reversed in some cases. We now proceed to multivariate analysis that controls for variations in firm and board characteristics.
[ Table 4 ]
Holding other variables constant, heterogeneity in directors' industry experience and ownership incentives has a negative effect on firm value. An increase from the 25 th percentile to the 75 th percentile of heterogeneity in ownership incentives (by 10.9) decreases market-to-book ratio by approximately 0.10. The effect continues to hold when heterogeneity in expertise is added to the regression. An increase from the 25 th percentile to the 75 th percentile of heterogeneity in industry expertise (by 0.23) decreases market-to-book by 0.18. Heterogeneity in the number of board appointments initially enters with a negative effect on firm value, which disappears after we control for director busyness and institutional ownership. Heterogeneity in director experience at firms with different growth opportunities is not statistically significant.
Most control variables enter with expected signs. Size, sales growth, and firm risk are positively related to market-to-book. Older firms have tend to have lower market-to-book. Firms with higher institutional ownership, higher director ownership, and smaller boards have higher firm valuations. Director busyness has a negative effect on firm value. Overall, it appears that the costs of coordination outweigh the benefits, and firms with greater heterogeneity in director ownership incentives and industry experience tend to have lower valuations.
We verify the robustness of the findings in Table 5 . Panel A of Table 5 Table 2 , we include three-digit SIC industry medians of board heterogeneity to capture industry-specific costs and benefits of heterogeneity, which are arguably exogenous for an individual firm. The variables of interest retain their signs and significance [ Table 5 ] Table 6 shows regressions of other corporate outcome variables on board heterogeneity and controls. We find that firms with more board heterogeneity have lower ROA. Heterogeneity in board appointments matters for future operating performance. We also find that CEO incentive pay is higher in companies with more homogeneous boards (along the dimensions of industry expertise and number of other appointments). Setting CEO compensation takes a coordinated action on the part of board members, and heterogeneous boards may be showing more reluctance to curb total pay levels or insist on equity incentives for the CEO. The result is economically significant. An increase in heterogeneity in industry expertise from the 25 th to the 75 th percentile has a 1.6% effect on the proportion of incentive pay (equivalent to 4.3% of the sample average). A greater degree of heterogeneity in industry expertise is also associated with lower cash holdings. For example, a one standard deviation increase in heterogeneity in industry expertise focus has a -6.3% on cash holdings as a percentage of total assets, which is Evidence on the effect of heterogeneity on investment behavior is mixed. Although heterogeneity in expertise with growth opportunities contributes to higher levels of total investment, dispersion in the number of board appointments has the opposite effect on capital expenditure. However, heterogeneous boards predict higher investment sensitivity to cash flow and heterogeneity in director ownership has the effect of lowering investment sensitivity to investment opportunities. It is possible that other forms of agency conflicts or private benefit acquisition are more pervasive than empire-building when director heterogeneity leads to coordination problems on corporate boards. Nevertheless, firms with heterogeneous boards appear to have some compensatory mechanisms in place, namely, higher dividend levels and, for boards with greater dispersion in the number of director board appointments, also higher leverage ratios.
V. Conclusion and future work
We have examined heterogeneity in director characteristics within corporate boards. 
